In this note, I will be discussing a few renditions of a principle about evidence that was proposed by Richard Feldman (2007) . The slogan for Feldman's principle is "evidence of evidence is evidence".
2 I begin with the following initial (naïve) rendition Feldman's principle.
(EEE1) If E (non-conclusively 3 ) supports the claim that (some subject) S possesses evidence which supports p, then E supports p.
This naïve rendition of Feldman's slogan is refuted by the following counterexample. A card c is going to be sampled at random from a standard deck. Consider the following claims about c:
c is the ace of spades.
c is an ace. Now, suppose that John knows exactly which card c is. And, suppose that what we've been told so far about the case is everything we know about the case. Then, plausibly, the following is true:
(1) E1 supports the claim that John possesses evidence (E2) which supports p.
Specifically, given the setup of the case, it seems clear that E1 supports the claim that John knows E2. Why? Here, I am presupposing the following principle concerning evidential support:
(2) E (evidentially) supports p iff E raises the (epistemic) probability of p.
Given the setup of the case, E1 raises the (epistemic) probability that John knows E2. So, assuming (2) is correct, E1 supports the claim that John knows E2. Thus, in this sense, it is clear E1 supports the claim that John possesses evidence -namely, E2 -that supports (indeed, entails 4 ) p. However, assuming (2), E1 itself does not support p, since E1 is (epistemically) probabilistically irrelevant to p. Thus, we have a counterexample to (EEE1), assuming principle (2).
In the next section, I will consider some alternative renditions of Feldman's "evidence of evidence is evidence" principle, and I will argue that these revisions of Feldman's principle are also untrue [assuming (2)].
Some revisions of "evidence of evidence is evidence"
Our counterexample to (EEE1) immediately suggests the following simple revision: Feldman (2011) has proposed the following alternative revision of his initial "evidence of evidence is evidence" principle: (EEE3) If S1 possesses evidence (E1) which supports the claim that S2 possesses evidence (E2) which supports p, then S1 possesses evidence (E3) which supports p.
This principle is distinct from principles (EEE1) and (EEE2), because -unlike (EEE1) and (EEE2) -(EEE3) does not imply that the evidence S1 possesses (E1) which supports the claim that S2 possesses evidence (E2) which supports p must be entailed by (viz., be part of the content of) the evidence S1 possesses (E3) which supports p. For this reason, the above counterexamples to (EEE1) and (EEE2) will not (as they stand) suffice to refute (EEE3). But, if we think a bit more about the sorts of counterexamples we've seen so far, we can (arguably) also find a way to refute (EEE3). In fact, a slight modification of our original counterexample to (EEE1) seems to do the trick. We can refute (EEE3) by bringing another subject (Jim) into our original counterexample to (EEE1). Suppose that Jim knows that E1 is true of the sampled card c. But, suppose that E1 is all Jim knows about c (apart from Jim's knowledge of the claim that John knows exactly which card c is). More precisely, suppose that Jim reasonably disbelieves or suspends judgment on all claims about capart from E1, the claim that John knows which card c is, and the logical consequences of these two claims about c. Then, it seems plausible that -despite the fact that Jim possesses evidence (E1) which supports the claim that John possesses evidence (E2) which supports p -Jim does not possess any evidence (E3) which supports p.
At least, it seems that the onus is on the defender of (EEE3) to tell us which part (E3) of Jim's evidence does support p. That is, the onus seems to be on the defender of (EEE3) to tell us which E3 is such that (i) Jim possesses E3 as evidence, and (ii) E3 supports p. After all, E3 can't be E1, since E1 is irrelevant to p. Moreover, E3 can't be E2, since Jim reasonably disbelieves or suspends judgment on
E2.
5 More generally, since I've setup the case in such a way that Jim reasonably disbelieves or suspends judgment on all claims about c, apart from E1, the claim that John knows which card c is, and the logical consequences of these two claims about c, it seems that nothing p-supporting will be part of Jim's evidence. Indeed, I think the reasonable conclusion to draw here is that there is no such E3 (or, at least, there need be no such E3) in our revised first counterexample.
I therefore conclude that Feldman's revised "evidence of evidence is evidence" principle (EEE3) is also false, assuming principle (2) about the relationship between evidential support and (epistemic) probabilistic relevance. Therefore, to the extent that (EEE3) is the state-of-the-art, the title of this note seems to be justified -at least on one very natural reading of "evidence".
